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bstract
The objective of this paper is to improve understanding of the market for Islamic finance in Africa. Specifically the paper provides a mapping of
frica-based Islamic finance providers, quantifies the amount of foreign Islamic funding received by Africa and compares performance of African
slamic and conventional banks. We find that there are significant cross country variations in the way Islamic banking has been developed in Africa
nd in the type of services offered. Our empirical findings also support the superior efficiency of Islamic banks and suggest that Islamic banking
ould be beneficial for Africa.
 2013 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. 
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 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license..  Introduction
Islamic financial institutions achieved annual growth rates in
xcess of 20% over the last decade, leading to an estimated mar-
et size of about USD 1.25 trillion in 2010 (The CityUK, 2011).1
his growth was mainly fostered by the innovative aspect of
slamic finance, reforms in regulatory and taxation frameworks
imed at accommodating Islamic financial activities, and efforts
 The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors’ only They should
ot be interpreted as those of the African Development Bank, its management or
hose of its member countries The authors would like to thank Mouna Ben Dhaou
or excellent research assistance and Soumendra Dash for useful comments.
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +216 71101609.
E-mail address: t.kangoye@afdb.org (T. Kangoye).
1 Throughout the paper Islamic finance refers to all financial assets and insti-
utions that are compliant with Shariah principles, namely the prohibition of
nterest and speculation (Riba and Gharar). The paper does not discuss the dis-
inguishing characteristics of Shariah-compliant institutions and instruments.
or such a detailed description, please refer to Iqbal et al. (1998), Aburime and
lo (2009), Mouawad (2009), Gait and Worthington (2008) and Islamic Finance
nd Global Financial Stability Report (2010).
eer review under responsibility of Africagrowth Institute.
879-9337 © 2013 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier
.V. 
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rdf.2013.08.003
i
k
fi
a
f
w
b
A
A
 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.ade to beef-up Islamic financial infrastructure geared towards
nsuring better risk management and corporate governance.
The origin of Islamic finance in Africa can be traced back
o the 1960s with Egypt being the first African country offer-
ng Islamic banking under a low profile for political reasons
Aburime and Alo, 2009; Mouawad, 2009). Several African
ountries followed suit which helped give raise to an African
arket for Islamic finance estimated at USD 37.5 billion as of
008 (The CityUK, 2011). While this figure looks high at first
ight, it remains negligible compared to the potential for Islamic
nance in Africa estimated at USD 235 billion (Moody’s, 2008).
hat’s more, the market for Islamic finance in Africa is not only
mall in absolute terms but also in relative terms with African
slamic financial institutions holding less than 3% of global
slamic financial assets. The disparity between the current state
f Islamic finance in Africa and its potential raises questions
bout constraints to the development of this type of finance.
ack of detailed information about Islamic finance providers
n Africa and on the performance of African Islamic financial
nstitutions further prevents a good understanding of this mar-
et. Indeed, research about the state and structure of the Islamic
nance market in Africa is rather scant.
The objective of this paper is to fill this gap in the liter-
ture by answering 3 questions. First, what does the market
or Islamic Finance in Africa look like? The paper provides
hat we believe is the first comprehensive mapping of Africa-
ased Islamic finance providers. Second, to what extent does
frica benefit from international Islamic funding? Third, how do
frican Islamic banks perform compared to their conventional
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low compared to what one would expect from a region that is
home to about 38% of Muslims living in Africa. For instance
GCC which counts a large Muslim population account for over
3 Figures discussed in this section are computed by the authors using different
data sources that are listed in Table 1. Note that institutions offering multiple
services were counted only once under their main area of focus to avoid double
counting. For instance, an Islamic bank that offers banking and microfinance
services is counted only once as an Islamic bank. Hence, figures discussed in
this section constitute lower bounds for Islamic finance providers in Africa.
4 The following country classification is used throughout the paper: NorthI. Faye et al. / Review of Deve
eers? The rationale for focusing on Islamic banks is twofold.
irst, banks represent the dominant players both in African
nancial systems and the global Islamic market.2 Hence, it is
mportant to identify differences in performance related to the
Islamic” characteristic of banks as this could have policy impli-
ations to further develop financial sectors in Africa. Second,
he market for Islamic non-bank financial institutions in Africa
emains embryonic which makes any robust statistical analysis
mpossible.
Our results show that the market for Islamic finance in Africa
emains severely underdeveloped and counts only 116 providers
rom 21 countries. This number falls to 67 when Sudan, which
arries a financial system that is Shariah-compliant, is excluded.
slamic banking is by far the most commonly offered Islamic
nance service with 74 providers. This is consistent with patterns
bserved in the conventional African financial system and the
lobal Islamic financial market. Yet, Islamic banking providers
n Africa remain scarce and represent less than 10% of com-
ercial banks operating in the 21 African countries offering
slamic financial services. Interestingly, Islamic banking has
een developed using 2 different models in Africa. The first
odel consists in setting up fully fledged Islamic banks while
he second model consists in setting up windows dedicated to
slamic finance within conventional banks. So far the first model
revails.
We find that North Africa counts the largest number of
slamic finance providers but that East Africa is home to the
argest number of Islamic banking providers. We attribute this
rend to the flexible approach that regulators have been adopt-
ng in East Africa and which is conducive to innovation. We
lso document strong variations in the type of Islamic finan-
ial services available in African countries. While South Africa
as been successful in developing Islamic investment funds,
est African countries have been more successful in developing
slamic microfinance.
Our research reveals also that Africa received at least USD
4 billion in Islamic project finance and USD 1.6 billion
rom Sukuk  issuances on international markets over the period
005–2012. While these amounts may look impressive at first
ight, they remain negligible compared to the continent’s needs.
or instance, the annual funding gap for infrastructure alone
s estimated at USD 93 billion. International Islamic funding
s not only limited but is also concentrated on few countries.
roject finance remains concentrated in North Africa which cap-
ured 82% of resources provided while Sukuk issuances remains
imited to 3 African countries.
Finally, our results suggest that Islamic banks in Africa are
ore stable as they report lower insolvency risk and higher
eturns on average assets. They also have lower non-performing
oan (NPL) ratios but higher loan loss provisions. This result
ikely reflects the fact that Islamic banking transactions are
acked by real assets giving very small room for speculation
nd lower NPLs. Our results suggest that Islamic banks adopt a
2 According to The CityUK (2011) 80% of global Islamic financial assets
ere controlled by Islamic banks in 2010.
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rudent approach to provisioning to circumvent taking avoidable
isks. These provisions are expected to help them to tide over
he difficult times without affecting their normal banking opera-
ions in case of any large scale defaults. Our results also suggest
hat Islamic banks are more efficient. Our findings are robust to
ontrols for country fixed effects and the share of assets held
y the government in the banking sector. They also have strong
olicy implications for financial sector development in Africa
s they tend to indicate a superior performance of Islamic banks
hich gives support to the development of such institutions in
frica.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section
 provides a mapping of the Islamic finance market in Africa
hile explaining the main identified trends. Section 3 describes
slamic funding flows that Africa was able to attract. In Sec-
ion 4 we empirically investigate differences in performance
etween African Islamic and conventional banks while Section
 concludes the paper.
.  Africa  as a  home  for  Islamic  ﬁnance:  a mapping
xercise
Our data show that the number of African countries offer-
ng Shariah-compliant products remains limited to 21 out of
4 African countries (Table 1). We also find a wide diversity
n the type of Islamic finance services available in Africa.3
e were able to identify 116 institutions offering 4 different
slamic financial services: 74 providers of Islamic banking,
3 institutions offering Islamic insurance “Takaful”, 4 offer-
ng Shariah-compliant investment services through investment
unds and 5 offering Islamic microfinance. Table 1 shows
hat East Africa counts the largest number of Islamic finance
roviders (65) followed by North and West Africa which count
espectively 25 and 14 providers.4 Interestingly, East Africa is
owngraded to the second position with 16 providers once we
xclude the Republic of Sudan (hereafter referred to as “Sudan”),
hich has a fully Shariah-compliant financial system.5
While North Africa counts the largest number of Islamic
nance providers if one excludes Sudan, their number remainsfrica: (Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya); Eastern Africa: (Sudan,
ganda, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan); West Africa: (Mali, Gambia, Burkina Faso,
enegal, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Togo, Niger, Benin); Central Africa: (Chad,
ameroon, Gabon); Southern Africa: (Mozambique). These countries were
dentified as those offering Islamic finance in their respective regions.
5 Under the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, it was agreed that the
epublic of South Sudan will have a conventional financial system while the
epublic of Sudan will maintain a financial system that is Shariah-compliant.
138
 
I.
 F
aye
 et
 al.
 /
 Review
 of
 D
evelopm
ent
 Finance
 3
 (2013)
 136–151
Table 1
Overview of Islamic finance providers in Africa.
Country Muslim population,
million (2011
estimates, unless
otherwise specified)
% Muslim (2011
estimates, unless
otherwise specified)
Islamic banks Banks with
Islamic
windows
Licensed
commercial
banks
Islamic insurance
companies (Takaful
operators or
companies)
Islamic fundsc Islamic
microfinance
services providers
Islamic fin.
services providers
(total)
Number Year of
reference
Number Year of
reference
Number Year of
reference
Number Year of
reference
Number Year of
reference
Number Year of
reference
North Africa 9 5 127 11 0 0 25
Algeria 35.05 99 2 2012 20 2012 1 2010 3
Egypt 75.32 90 3 2012 1 2010 39 2011 4 2010 8
Libya 6.53 (2012) 97 (2012) 0 2012 16 2012 2 2008 2
Mauritania 3.36 100 2 2012 12 2011 2 2008 4
Morocco 31.99 99 0 2012 4 2010 19 2010 0 2010 4
Tunisia 10.52 98 2 2012 21 2012 2 2010 4
West Africa 6 1 126 4 0 3 14
Cameroon 1 2012 1
Gambia 1.66 90 1 2012 14 2012 1 2008 2
Ghana 4.01 (2012) 15.9 (2012) 0a 2010 0 2012 27 2012 2 2012 2
Guinea 9.25 85 2 2012 12 2010 2
Liberia 0.47 12.2 0 2012 9 2012 0
Mali 13.08 90 0 2010 13 2012 1 2007 1
Nigeria 85.06 (2012) 50 1 2011 1 2011 21 2012 1 2012 3
Niger 13.66 92 1 2012 10 2012 1
Senegal 12.19 95 1 2012 0 2012 20 2012 1 2008 2
Eastern Africa 39 9 112 15 0 2 65
Djibouti 0.73 94 4 2012 0 2009 7 2012 4
Kenya 4.30 (2012) 10 (2012) 2 2012 5 2012 43 2012 7
Sudan (Rep. of) 30.86 (2010) 71.4 (2010) 32 2010 32 2010 15 2008 2b 2013 49
Tanzania 15.26 (2012) 35 (2012) 1 2012 4 2012 30 2012 5
Southern Africa 2 3 93 3 4 0 12
Mauritius 0.22 16.6 1 2011 1 2010 20 2012 2
South Africa 0.73 (2012) 1.5 (2012) 1 2012 2 2012 73 2012 3 2010 4 2013 10
TOTAL 56 18 458 33 4 5 116
This table summarises our mapping of home-based Islamic finance providers in Africa. We used various data sources including: Ernst and Young (2011, 2012), Central Banks’ websites contents and annual reports,
Moody’s (2008), Middle East Insurance Review (MIR) (2008), El-Quaqa et al. (2009), Nimrah et al. (2008), CIA World Factbook (World Muslim Population by Country), MixMarket (www.mixmarket.org), Islamic
Finance Information Service (IFIS) and CGAP (2007).
a Does not include Stanbic Bank Ghana which was reported to apply for an Islamic banking license in 2012 (http://www.theislamicglobe.com/index.php?option=com content&view=article&id=1365:
stanbic-on-stand-by-in-ghana&catid=8:artcile&Itemid=40).
b Does not count Islamic commercial banks which were directed by the Central Bank of Sudan to allocate 12% of their total lending portfolio to microfinance funding.
c Africa-based Shariah-compliant funds.
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0% of the Islamic finance market. Differences in the size of
slamic finance markets between the two regions seem to arise
rom disparities in wealth levels. Indeed, average GDP per capita
tood at USD 61,450 for GCC in 2012 against USD 4800 for
orth Africa. Nevertheless, wealth distribution alone cannot
xplain why Islamic finance is not more prominent in North
frica. Indeed, with the exception of Southern Africa, North
frica is the most economically prosperous region in the conti-
ent (GDP per capita in North Africa is estimated at USD 7208
n 2012 compared to USD 2466 for Sub-Saharan Africa). The
egion encompasses five middle income countries while Sub-
aharan Africa is mainly composed of low income countries.
Several arguments have been put forward to explain why
slamic finance is not more prominent in North Africa. First,
ost North African countries are new comers to the Islamic
nance market. Until recently, the economic elites and author-
ties in most North African countries have been overlooking
slamic finance because they did not see a great potential
n this type of finance. They were also trying to safeguard
he politico-religious equilibrium and prevent entry points for
slamic fundamentalism and terrorism which Islamic finance
as thought to facilitate. Only lately did local authorities become
ognizant of the need and possibility to tap into resources from
he GCC to fund the increasing demand for investments. Gait
2009) finds that recent interest in Islamic finance from Libyan
anks and consumers for instance reflects mainly the increasing
eed for funding to support economic development rather than
eligious beliefs. Second, most of the Muslims in the region are
rom Malikite  obedience. As such, they turn out to be moderate
s compared to their peers from the Middle-East. Interestingly,
 significant part of the population in North Africa does not
onsider interest payment as Riba.  Consequently, retail bank-
ng and credit to consumers keep flourishing. Last but not least,
nappropriate regulatory and tax frameworks in the region made
slamic finance more expensive than conventional products and
herefore less appealing to consumers.
.1.  Islamic  banking
Islamic banking is available in 15 African countries and dom-
nates the African market for Islamic finance, capturing 64%
f Islamic finance providers (Table 1).6 The predominance of
slamic banking mainly reflects the low level of financial sector
evelopment in most African countries whereby non-bank finan-
ial institutions are often inexistent or scarce. In other words,
ainly banks in Africa seem to have the capacity to develop and
arket innovative services such as Shariah-compliant products
nd to understand and manage their inherent risks. Interestingly,
e found 2 business models that are being used in Africa to
ffer Islamic banking. The first model consists in setting up
ully-fledged Islamic banks while the second model consists
n operating as a conventional bank whilst offering dedicated
indows to Islamic banking. The first model prevails with 56
ully-fledged Islamic banks. Once Sudan is excluded, the 2
6 The share remains almost unchanged (63%) if Sudan is excluded.
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odels count comparable number of institutions with a slight
dvantage for the Islamic bank model.
With the notable exception of Sudan, the number of Islamic
anking providers remains negligible relative to conventional
anks. Indeed, Islamic banking providers represent only 16%
f total commercial banks operating in the 21 countries offer-
ng Islamic financial services and the share falls to about 10%
nce Sudan, which counts alone 32 fully fledged Islamic banks,
s excluded. Sudan emerges as the most prominent market
or Islamic banking in terms of number of Islamic banking
roviders. This is driven by the fact that the country requires
ull compliance with Shariah  principles for the entire financial
ystem.
Table 1 shows that East Africa counts the largest number of
nstitutions offering Islamic banking. This trend holds even when
udan is excluded. Excluding Sudan, Kenya has the largest num-
er of Islamic banking providers. The country hosts 2 Islamic
anks and 5 Islamic windows. Tanzania follows suit with 4
slamic windows and 1 Islamic bank. Flexibility in regulators’
ttitude could explain the development of Islamic banking in
hose countries where Islam is not the dominant religion. North
frica ranks second in terms of Islamic banking providers with
gypt and Morocco leading the way with 4 Islamic banking
roviders each. Interestingly, Islamic banking in Morocco is
ffered through Islamic windows only. This is a reflection of
ank Al-Maghrib’s (Morocco Central Bank) reluctance to issue
icenses to Islamic banks, and to the apparent lack of buy-in from
he Moroccan elite. Libya does not count any institution offer-
ng Islamic banking. This is definitely not a reflection of lack of
nterest from banks to offer such services. A survey of Libyan
anks conducted in 2007–2008, revealed that two-third of sur-
eyed Libyan banks are eager to offer Islamic finance products
nd services (Gait, 2009).
West Africa counts 7 institutions offering Islamic banking
ith Nigeria and Guinea leading the way with 2 institutions each.
slamic banking in West Africa is being offered mainly through
slamic banks. Only Nigeria counts an Islamic window. Most of
hese Islamic banks were established under the form of joint-
entures involving Islamic development financial institutions
uch as the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), and Investors
rom the Gulf. For instance, 3 Islamic banks from the WAEMU
one (Senegal, Guinea, and Niger) belong to the same bank
roup which counts the IsDB as a majority shareholder. Finan-
ial authorities in the WAEMU region have shown commitment
o further develop Islamic finance, and efforts are being made to
mend the regulatory framework to accommodate Islamic bank-
ng. The IsDB is providing technical assistance to support these
fforts.
South Africa and Mauritius are the only countries offer-
ng Islamic banking in Southern Africa but the number of
slamic banking providers is low compared to other regions. This
ontrasts with the high level of financial sector sophistication
eported for these 2 countries. Our research also suggests that
entral Africa does not count Islamic banking providers. These
rends could reflect the small Muslim population and the small
ize and political instability in some countries in those regions as
ell as lack of customer education and awareness. Nevertheless,
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(Fig. 1).7 The regional distribution of projects’ value shows a
stronger dominance of North Africa which captures alone 82%
of funding provided. Egypt is the largest beneficiary of foreign40 I. Faye et al. / Review of Deve
he prospects of Islamic banking in Southern Africa are promis-
ng, particularly in South Africa where regulators have been
mplementing reforms to foster the development of Islamic
nance. These reforms include the introduction of tax neutral-
ty for Mudharabah, Murabahah  and Musharakah. Mauritius
as also good prospects in developing Islamic banking. Accord-
ng to Moody’s (2008), the Central bank of Mauritius became
 member of the International Financial Services Board, and
artnerships have been sealed with potential partners in both
alaysia and Gulf countries. Mauritian authorities have also
aken steps to develop Islamic banking activities, starting with
he provision of licenses to operate Islamic windows. So far
SBC Bank Mauritius is the only conventional bank offering
hariah-compliant banking services in the country. It operates
ollowing HSBC Amanah, the global Islamic finance services
ivision of the parent company HSBC Group.
.2.  Other  Shariah-compliant  ﬁnancial  services
Our research suggests that Islamic insurance, referred to as
akaful, is the second most developed segment of the Islamic
nance market in Africa. We were able to identify 33 institutions
roviding Islamic insurance or Takaful  in 10 African countries,
ut of which 15 are located in Sudan (Table 1). According to the
orld Takaful Report, Africa gross Takaful  premiums amounted
o USD 540 million in 2012. The Sudanese Takaful  market is by
ar the most important in Africa and ranks as the third largest
n the World after GCC and Malaysia. This owes to the full
hariah compliance of the financial system. Excluding Sudan,
orth Africa hosts the largest number of Takaful providers with
1 operators. Morocco does not offer Takaful  services because
f inefficiencies in the current regulatory framework. Indeed,
he insurance code requires insurance companies to hold 70%
f their investments in specific assets such as treasury bonds
hich are interest bearing. This prevents the development of
akaful companies which cannot invest in such assets. The rest
f Takaful  companies are located in 3 West African countries
The Gambia, Ghana and Senegal) and Southern Africa (South
frica).
The limited number of Takaful  providers in Africa mainly
eflects inefficiencies in existing regulatory and taxation frame-
orks. For instance, the lack of Shariah-compliant investment
ehicles prevents Takaful  companies from managing their
egulated reserves according to Shariah  principals. This is
xacerbated by the fact that several African countries require
inimum investment of regulated reserves in government bonds
hich are interest bearing and therefore Shariah  non-compliant.
Africa counts at least 5 Islamic microfinance providers.
udan counts 2 Islamic microfinance providers which offered
n 2011 loans valued USD 64.5 million to 63,900 clients (mix
arket). Yet, this figure underestimates the amount of microfi-
ance offered in the country since the Central Bank of Sudan
equires banks to allocate 12% of their total lending to micro-
nance operations (representing an equivalent of about USD
50 million in 2012). With the notable exception of Sudan,
slamic microfinance is embryonic in Africa, with only 3 insti-
utions offering Islamic microfinance for the entire continent.
t
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hese providers are located in 3 West African countries, namely
ameroon, Mali and Nigeria. Most recent available estimates
how that Islamic microfinance benefited 2812 clients in 2007
n Mali for a total outstanding amount of USD 273,298 (Nimrah
t al., 2008). The underdevelopment of Islamic microfinance
n Africa reflects several factors. These include missing regu-
atory frameworks and institutional weaknesses in most MFIs
perating in Africa which prevents innovation.
We use the Eurekahedge database to track Africa-based
slamic investment funds. We were able to identify 4 Islamic
unds with a total size of USD 156 million. These funds are all
ased in South Africa and three of them are managed by the Oasis
rescent Management Company Ltd., a regulated South African
ollective Investment Scheme administrator, which obtained an
perating license in 1999. These funds’ investment strategy is
ocused on equity securities. The dominance of South Africa in
his segment is not surprising given the high level of financial
ector development and the conducive environment that South
frica offers to investors. The 4 Africa-based Islamic funds have
n average size of USD 39 million, which is small compared to
he average size of a conventional African Fund. By way of
llustration, the average size of an Africa-based private equity
und is estimated at USD 193 million by the Prequin  Private
quity Fund Database. This supports Abd-Karim (2010) con-
lusion that Islamic funds tend to be smaller than conventional
unds.
.  Africa  as a  recipient  of  foreign  Islamic  funding
The previous section focuses on Africa-based Islamic finance
roviders. Yet, our research reveals that Africa has been also a
ecipient of Islamic funding provided by investors located out-
ide the continent. This section provides an attempt to quantify
hese flows.
.1.  Africa  as  a  recipient  of  Islamic  project  ﬁnance
We use the project finance database published by the Islamic
inance Information Service (IFIS) to track African projects
hat benefited from Islamic funding. Our research unveils 104
rojects in 21 African countries that were implemented over
he period 2005–2012. These projects received USD 14 bil-
ion in Shariah-compliant financing, most of which comes from
slamic banks and Islamic Development Financial Institutions
IsDFI) (including the Islamic Development Bank, the Interna-
ional Islamic Trade Finance Corporation and the Arab Fund
or Economic and Social Development). The regional distribu-
ion of these projects’ number is as follow: North Africa (37%),
est Africa (33%), East Africa (23%) and Central Africa (7%)7 The list of projects provided by IFIS may not be exhaustive. It is used here
o draw broad trends about regional, sector and financing type distribution of
oreign Islamic finance that benefited Africa.
I. Faye et al. / Review of Development Finance 3 (2013) 136–151 141
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lion by corporate entities. Mauritius ranks second. While the
country was a late comer to the Sukuk  market, it successfully
raised USD 560 million between 2012 and 2013.Fig. 1. Regional distribution of Islamic project fi
ource: Authors’ calculation using data from Islamic Finance Information Serv
slamic financing with 17 projects that received USD 3.53 bil-
ion. The remaining USD 2.8 billion that benefited sub-Saharan
frica were shared as follows: East Africa (USD 1.5 billion,
1%), West Africa (USD 755.9 million, 5%) and Central Africa
USD 339.7 million, 2%) (Fig. 1). The predominance of North
frica mainly reflects the conducive investment climate offered
y the region. It could also be a reflection of similarities in cul-
ure, language and religion between North African countries and
ulf countries from which most of the Islamic funding originates.
In terms of sector distribution, about a third (29%) of total
esources provided (corresponding to about USD 4 billion) ben-
fited 10 projects in the financial sector. These projects were
ocated in North Africa (4), East Africa (2), West Africa (3) and
entral Africa (1). Surprisingly, there were no investments in
he financial sector in Southern Africa despite the fact the some
ountries in the region such as South Africa and Mauritius offer
eveloped financial sectors. This suggests that best investment
pportunities for Islamic finance providers were not necessarily
n more developed financial systems. Infrastructure (e.g. trans-
orts, power, construction, utilities and health facilities) is the
econd largest sector benefiting from Islamic project finance tar-
eting Africa with about 17% of total resources. Investments in
he manufacturing sector rank third with a much lower share
3%) while agriculture, oil and mineral extraction, real estate
nd education are less served with less than 3% each (Fig. 2).
.2.  Africa  as  a  Sukuk  Issuer
The first African Sukuk  issued on international markets date
ack to 2005 but the number of issuances has been very limited
ver time both in number and value (Fig. 3a and b). According to
he Sukuk  database published by the Islamic Finance Information
ervice (IFIS), 5 Sukuk  issuances were made on international
arkets over the period 2005–2013 (Q2) by African entities: 3orporate obligors and 1 sovereign obligor, namely the Sudan
inancial Services Company, a company fully owned by the
entral Bank of Sudan. These issuances raised about USD 1.6
illion, out of which USD 800 million was raised by the Sudan
F
S
S transactions (number and value) (2005–2012).
IS).
inancial Services Company in 2010 through Al-Ijara  Sukuk
Fig. 3b). Our data show that African obligors used various
ypes of Sukuk to raise Islamic funding, including Sukuk  Al
usharakah, Sukuk  Murabahah  and Sukuk  Al  Ijara.  Yet, one
annot draw any conclusions about the use of instruments given
he small number of issuances.
Our data show that the issuances of international African
ukuk are not only scarce but also restricted to 3 countries,
amely Sudan, Mauritius and Namibia. Namibia was the first
ountry to issue Sukuk  in 2005. This was a USD 100 million 5-
ear Sukuk  issued by a commercial real estate company. Sudan
ade 2 Sukuk  issuances that allowed the country to raise about
SD 930 million over the period 2007–2010, out of which USD
00 million was raised by sovereign entities and USD 130 mil-ig. 2. Sector distribution of Islamic project finance transactions (2005–2012).
ource: Authors’ calculation using data from Islamic Finance Information
ervice (IFIS).
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.  Islamic  banks  in  Africa:  how  do  they  perform?
This section empirically explores differences in performance
etween Islamic and conventional banks in Africa. We first
eview the relevant literature with the objective to draw hypoth-
sis for our empirical work. Next we describe our data, variables
nd methodology. The last part of this section summarises our
ain findings.
.1.  Literature  review
Growth in Islamic finance has prompted an interest on how
slamic financial institutions perform compared to their conven-
ional counterparts in terms of profitability, efficiency, liquidity
nd stability. An emerging literature has been investigating these
onsiderations, with a particular focus on Islamic banks which
epresent the dominant players in the Islamic finance market.
ompliance with Shariah  imposes costs and constraints on the
ctivities of Islamic banks which can make the structure of
heir assets and liabilities and their risk profile different from
hose of conventional banks. This could lead to differences in
erformance.
On efficiency and liquidity, Mohamad et al. (2007) and
ore recently Johnes et al. (2012) find no significant differ-
nces between the overall efficiency of conventional and Islamic
anks. Conversely, Al-Khasawneh et al. (2012) find that Islamic
anks achieved higher average revenue efficiency scores over
onventional banks in North Africa. Yet the growth rate of
evenue efficiency scores for Islamic bank is lower than for con-
entional banks. Halkano (2012) on the other hand, finds that
onventional banks in Kenya perform better than Islamic banks.
et his results support previous conclusions on the greater liquid-
ty of Islamic banks. Beck et al. (2013) reveal little significant
ifferences between Islamic and conventional banks in business
rientation, efficiency, asset quality, or stability. The authors
how that higher cost-effectiveness of Islamic banks is not robust
o the sampling methodology. Interestingly, they find that con-
entional banks operating in countries with a higher market share
or Islamic banks are more cost-effective but less stable. They
a
H
c
Son International markets (2005–2013Q2).
FIS) online Sukuk database (http://www.islamicfinanceservice.com).
lso find that Islamic banks better weathered the 2008 global
nancial crisis thanks to stronger capitalization and liquidity
eserves. IMF (2009) reaches a similar conclusion using a sam-
le of banks from GCC. On average, capital adequacy ratios
nd liquidity levels of Islamic banks in the GCC are found to be
igher than for conventional banks.
On stability, ˇCihák and Hesse (2010) investigate differences
n stability between Islamic and conventional banks using z-
cores as a measure of stability and a sample of banks from
0 countries in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. Their results
uggest that while small Islamic banks tend to be more stable
han small conventional banks, large conventional banks tend
o be more stable than large Islamic banks. Conversely, using
 sample of 12 Islamic banks and 71 conventional banks from
ndonesia and z-scores to measure bank stability, Gamaginta and
okhim (2010) find that Islamic banks are in general less stable
ompared to conventional banks and that small Islamic banks
end to perform similarly to conventional banks. Rajhi (2012)
n the other hand finds that Islamic banks are on average more
table than conventional banks, except for small Islamic banks.
To the best of our knowledge, our study provides the first
mpirical analysis of differences in performance between con-
entional and Islamic banks operating in Africa. Unlike previous
apers which use either country case studies or a sample of
frican banks as part of a larger sample covering multiple
egions (see Appendix 1), we use a sample exclusively consti-
uted of African banks from 45 countries. Based on the literature
eview, we are not able to draw any expectations related to
ifferences in the performance of Islamic banks relative to con-
entional banks.
.2.  Data  and  variables
We collect bank-level balance sheet and income statement
ata from BankScope by bureau van dijk. Bankscope covers large share of the banking sector in most African countries.
ence, it allows us to construct a sample that provides a good
overage of the banking sector in the countries under study.
pecifically we collect from Bankscope data to measure banks’
lopme
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usiness orientation, efficiency, asset quality and stability as well
s variables to control for bank characteristics. These variables
re described later in the text. We only focus on commercial
anks to avoid variations in results caused by differences in
usiness models, legal structures and mandates.
We relate bank-level data to country-level variables control-
ing for the level of economic and financial sector development
n the country as well as institutional quality. These variables
re collected from the World Development Indicators database,
he financial structure and regulation database published by the
aking Finance Work for Africa partnership/African Develop-
ent Bank, and the Heritage foundation. Our sample comprises
90 African banks: 279 conventional and 11 Islamic banks oper-
ting in 45 countries over the period 2005–2010.8
As in Beck et al. (2013), we consider 4 broad dimensions of
ank performance: business orientation, efficiency, asset qual-
ty and stability. We rely on 2 variables to measure efﬁciency:
verheads and the cost to income ratio. Overheads represent the
alue of overhead costs divided by total costs. Higher values
f these ratios describe lower efficiency levels. Business  ori-
ntation is measured using the loan to deposits ratio as well
s an index suggested by Demirgüc¸-Kunt and Huizinga (2010),
amely the ratio of fee-based income to total operating income.
hird, we use 2 measures for asset  quality: loan loss provisions
nd the non-performing loans ratio (both relative to gross loans).
inally we use 3 variables to measure bank stability: the return
n average assets, the equity to assets ratio and the z-score. The
-score is measured using the following formula:
 = ROA  +  CAR
SD(ROA)
here ROA  is the return on assets, CAR  is the capital-asset ratio
nd SD  (ROA)  is the standard deviation of the return on assets and
roxies the return’s volatility. The z-score is inversely related to
nsolvency probability. A higher z-score therefore corresponds
o a lower risk of insolvency (Beck et al., 2013; ˇCihák and Hesse,
010).
Our model controls for time-variant bank and country char-
cteristics that may affect bank business orientation, efficiency,
sset quality and stability. Specifically we control for the follow-
ng bank characteristics: Size  (measured by the natural logarithm
f total assets). Larger banks are likely to benefit from economies
f scale (Beck et al., 2006; Demirgüc¸-Kunt et al., 2004). Yet, they
ay also be less performing given complexity of their operations
eading to inefficiencies. As in Beck et al. (2013), we also con-
rol for the opportunity  costs  of  having  non-earning  assets  and
on-lending  business  by including respectively the ratio of fixed
ssets to total assets and the share of non-interest earning assets.
8 Given data availability, our sample covers the following African countries:
lgeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape
erde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial
uinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau,
enya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco,
ozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Sene-
al, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo,
unisia, Uganda, Zambia.
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emirgüc¸-Kunt et al. (2004) and Demirgüc¸-Kunt and Huizinga
2010) show that both aspects affect bank efficiency and stability.
We also control for the following country characteristics:
evel of  economic  development  measured by the natural loga-
ithm of the GDP per capita and the rate of GDP growth; level
f ﬁnancial  sector  development  measured by the ratio of private
redit to GDP; and structure  of  the  banking  sector  measured by
evel of concentration in the banking sector. We also control for
he quality  of  the  institutional  environment  by including an index
easuring financial freedom in the country because restrictions
mposed on banks are likely to influence their performance (Beck
t al., 2013). Triki et al. (2013) also show that the regulatory
ramework affects bank performance in Africa. Hence, we use
 variables to control for the regulatory  framework: restrictions
n activities, overall capital stringency and supervision qual-
ty. Appendix 2 provides a detailed description of our variables
nd their data sources while Tables 3 and 4 provide respectively
escriptive statistics and a correlation matrix.
.3.  Methodology
In order to empirically explore differences in the performance
f Islamic and conventional African banks, we use the following
egression model:
erfi,j,t =  α  +  βIslamici +  γBank  controlsi,j,t +  δControlsj,t
+  ϕyeart +  εi,t
here Perf  is one of our measures of business orientation, effi-
iency, asset quality and stability of bank i  in country j in year t
s discussed in the previous section. Islamic  is a dummy variable
hat takes the value of 1 for Islamic banks, and 0 otherwise. Bank
ontrols and country controls are respectively vectors including
ariables controlling for bank and country characteristics. εi,t
s the error term and yeart are fixed-year effects. All specifica-
ions are estimated using Generalised Least Squares. We allow
lustering of standard errors by bank given that some countries
eport a significantly larger number of banks than others which
ould bias standard errors downward (Beck et al., 2013).
.4.  Empirical  ﬁndings
The main results are summarised in Table 2.9 Columns (1) and
2) report our findings for business orientation while specifica-
ions (3) and (4) include results for efficiency measures. Columns
5) and (6) display results for asset quality while columns (7)–(9)
eport results for our 3 measures of bank stability. Overall, we
nd that Islamic banks have lower cost to income and higher
-score, return on average assets and equity assets ratio. These
esults suggest that African Islamic banks are more efficient
nd stable than conventional banks. Our findings support Al-
hasawneh et al. (2012) conclusion on the superior performance
9 Given the small size of our Islamic banks sample, we were not able to test
ifferences in performance between small and large Islamic banks as done in
everal papers cited in the literature review.
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Table 2
Performance of Islamic banking in Africa: results of the main model.
Business Orientation Efficiency Asset Quality Stability
Fee income Loans deposit
ratio
Cost income
ratio
Overheads Loan loss
provisions
NPL Z-score ROAA Equity assets
ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Islamic 0.0316
(0.120)
−0.793
(1.138)
−0.153**
(0.0709)
−0.0341
(0.0362)
0.548*
(0.329)
−0.101**
(0.0412)
52.11***
(14.77)
0.00960***
(0.00310)
0.0636**
(0.0253)
Assets (log) −0.00291
(0.00392)
−0.0955
(0.0602)
−0.0452***
(0.0136)
−0.00341
(0.00409)
−0.000453
(0.000695)
−0.000873
(0.00304)
−2.499**
(1.073)
0.00145
(0.000892)
−0.0127***
(0.00351)
Other earnings −0.00151*
(0.000781)
0.00592
(0.00801)
0.000185
(0.000783)
−0.000786***
(0.000295)
0.000602
(0.000853)
−0.000191
(0.000127)
−0.00902
(0.0388)
5.75e-
05
(9.34e-
05)
0.000223
(0.000513)
Fixed assets 0.671
(0.473)
1.104
(1.503)
8.172***
(2.394)
1.114***
(0.274)
0.0391
(0.108)
1.269**
(0.513)
−4.083
(16.23)
−0.463***
(0.0990)
0.126
(0.340)
GDP per capita (log) 0.0132
(0.00819)
0.340*
(0.194)
0.0135
(0.0324)
−0.0350***
(0.0118)
0.000565
(0.00250)
−0.00376
(0.00763)
1.103
(2.847)
−0.00304
(0.00188)
0.0193**
(0.00931)
GDP growth −0.353**
(0.159)
1.303
(2.398)
−0.360
(0.458)
0.456***
(0.123)
0.0353
(0.0421)
−0.0437
(0.160)
8.804
(7.634)
−0.00846
(0.0550)
−0.187
(0.117)
Concentration ratio −0.0588
(0.0622)
−1.170
(1.484)
−0.0860
(0.112)
0.102*
(0.0529)
−0.0255
(0.0175)
−0.149**
(0.0619)
3.769
(5.741)
0.0227*
(0.0125)
0.0645*
(0.0383)
Financial freedom index −0.000740
(0.000536)
−0.0103
(0.00931)
0.00172
(0.00212)
0.000282
(0.000449)
9.97e-
05
(0.000107)
−0.00118***
(0.000428)
0.0337
(0.0324)
−8.69e-
05
(0.000110)
−0.000385
(0.000297)
Private credit GDP ratio 0.00437
(0.0349)
0.813
(0.511)
0.178***
(0.0593)
−0.143***
(0.0363)
0.00673
(0.00702)
0.0511**
(0.0260)
11.24*
(6.208)
−0.0146**
(0.00646)
−0.0508*
(0.0261)
Restrictions on activity 0.000934
(0.00976)
0.324
(0.259)
−0.000474
(0.0166)
0.00297
(0.00727)
0.00515
(0.00334)
0.0115
(0.00745)
3.441*
(2.001)
−0.00216
(0.00152)
0.00399
(0.00409)
Supervision quality −0.00326
(0.00667)
−0.00875
(0.117)
0.0195
(0.0207)
0.0119
(0.00869)
−0.00276*
(0.00142)
−0.00379
(0.00523)
−0.167
(1.409)
0.000631
(0.00140)
0.0117**
(0.00516)
Overall capital stringency 0.00241
(0.00459)
−0.154**
(0.0775)
−0.0174
(0.0165)
−0.00865*
(0.00452)
−0.00238
(0.00164)
−0.00405
(0.00415)
0.207
(1.089)
0.00310***
(0.000949)
0.00450
(0.00353)
Constant 0.226***
(0.0846)
−0.376
(1.143)
0.529
(0.341)
0.799***
(0.124)
0.0251
(0.0261)
0.216***
(0.0835)
7.847
(20.65)
0.0282
(0.0215)
−0.00725
(0.0966)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 1122 12 1176 1186 1125 714 1208 1206 1208
Banks 233 234 234 235 230 174 235 235 235
This table compares performance of African Islamic and conventional banks. Our sample is a 6 period panel of yearly observations over the period 2005–2010. It covers 290 commercial banks from 45 African
countries. Estimations (1) to (9) are done using GLS clustered by banks. P-values are computed using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and are reported between the parentheses. *, ** and *** represent
statistical significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% level. For a detailed description of variables and data sources, please refer to Appendix 2.
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Table 3
Islamic banking in Africa: descriptive statistics.
Variables Mean Standard dev. Median Min Max N
Dependent variables
Fee income 0.260 0.353 0.224 −0.072 9.718 1366
Loans deposit ratio 0.838 2.807 0.614 0.000 56.822 1536
Cost income ratio 0.652 0.457 0.585 0.051 6.725 1494
Overheads 0.638 0.187 0.651 0.044 1.139 1485
Loan Loss provisions 0.022 0.071 0.010 −0.402 1.000 1396
NPL 0.087 0.116 0.049 0.000 0.921 816
Z-score 23.497 34.284 15.907 −10.976 500.124 1556
ROAA 0.015 0.046 0.018 −0.975 0.200 1554
Equity assets ratio 0.130 0.118 0.107 −0.971 0.992 1556
Explanatory variables
Islamic 0.036 0.186 0.000 0.000 1.000 1556
Assets (log) 5.663 2.199 5.717 −4.619 11.651 1556
Other earnings 0.497 2.876 0.328 0.000 104.788 1524
Fixed assets 0.033 0.029 0.024 0.000 0.193 1543
GDP per capita (log) 7.144 1.056 6.961 5.037 9.397 1556
GDP Growth 0.053 0.036 0.055 −0.098 0.378 1556
Concentration ratio 0.631 0.183 0.621 0.305 1.000 1494
Financial freedom Index 47.682 13.190 50.000 20.000 70.000 1411
Private credit GDP ratio 0.290 0.320 0.165 0.009 1.501 1509
Restrictions on activity 4.216 1.368 3.889 1.944 8.333 1556
Supervision quality 4.156 1.340 3.750 1.875 7.500 1348
Overall capital stringency 6.159 1.925 7.000 2.000 9.000 1556
Government ownership 0.171 0.239 0.057 0.000 0.922 1290
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ihis Table summarises descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regress
ppendix 2.
f Islamic banks and Rajhi (2012) findings on the superior sta-
ility of Islamic banks. In line with Beck et al. (2013), columns
1) and (2) show that there are no statistically significant differ-
nces in business orientations between Islamic and conventional
anks in Africa. Results reported in Table 2 suggest mixed con-
lusions about differences in asset quality between Islamic and
onventional banks. Indeed, we find that Islamic banks have
ower non-performing loans but higher loan loss provisions. The
ower level of NPLs likely reflects the fact that Islamic banking
s asset backed and does not allow speculation. This leaves less
oom for potential losses and is consistent with the superior
esilience that Islamic banks exhibited during the 2008 financial
risis. The positive coefficient we report for loan loss provisions
uggest that Islamic banks in Africa have a more conservative
pproach to provisioning.
Results for control variables show that higher levels of fixed
ssets are associated with lower levels of efficiency and lower
sset quality and stability as measured respectively by non-
erforming loans ratio and return on average assets. We also
nd that regulation affects African bank’s performance. Indeed,
ur results suggest that higher restrictions on activities are asso-
iated with higher levels of bank solvency. On the other hand,
ore stringent capital requirements are associated with lower
oans to deposits ratios, lower overhead costs and higher return
n average assets. Banks in countries with better supervision
uality show higher levels of capitalization and report lower
oan loss provisions. Our results also suggest that banks oper-
ting in countries that are more economically developed (as
easured by GDP per capita) have higher levels of loan to
4
analysis. For a detailed description of variables and data sources, please refer to
eposit and equity assets ratios and lower overheads. The posi-
ive relationship between GDP per capita and loan to deposit
atio could reflect the fact that economic development spurs
nancial intermediation but could also reflect a reverse causality
hereby countries where banks intermediate a higher level of
esources are likely to develop at a stronger pace. Regarding
ank efficiency, larger banks are found to be more efficient
s they exhibit lower cost to income ratios. This is consistent
ith the economies of scale argument. Banks operating in faster
rowing economies seem to be more efficient (using overhead
s a measure of efficiency). The banking sector concentration
nters significantly in the regressions of efficiency, asset qual-
ty and stability, with a positive impact of 0.1 on overheads, a
egative impact of −0.15 on non-performing loans and a pos-
tive impact of 0.02 and 0.06 on ROAA and equity to assets
atio respectively. These results suggest that banks operating in
oncentrated systems are less likely to report non-performing
oans, have stronger capitalization and lower insolvency risk,
ut are less efficient. Interestingly, the impact of private credit
o GDP ratio on efficiency is positive when efficiency is mea-
ured by overheads and negative when it is measured by cost
o income ratio. This suggests that, when private credit to GDP
ncreases, banks’ total costs increase, mainly through an increase
n non-overhead costs..5.  Robustness  check
In order to test the robustness of our findings, we first rerun
ll specifications reported in Table 2 while adding a control for
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Table 4
Islamic banking in Africa: pairwise correlation matrix.
Islamic Assets
(log)
Other
earnings
Fixed
assets
GDP per
capita
(log)
GDP
growth
Concentration
ratio
Financial
freedom
index
Private
credit
GDP ratio
Restrictions
on activity
Supervision
quality
Overall
capital
stringency
Government
ownership
Islamic 1.0000
Assets (log) 0.0130
(0.6094)
1.0000
Other earnings −0.0060
(0.8165)
−0.0323
(0.2070)
1.0000
Fixed assets 0.1755*
(0.0000)
−0.1435*
(0.0000)
−0.0473
(0.0662)
1.0000
GDP per capita (log) 0.0051
(0.8415)
0.2515*
(0.0000)
0.0282
(0.2718)
−0.3152*
(0.0000)
1.0000
GDP growth 0.0632*
(0.0126)
−0.0947*
(0.0002)
−0.0071
(0.7804)
0.1147*
(0.0000)
−0.2163*
(0.0000)
1.0000
Concentration ratio −0.0575
(0.0263)
*0.0778
(0.0026)
*0.0225
(0.3882)
0.0543*
(0.0364)
0.0689*
(0.0077)
−0.1064*
(0.0000)
1.0000
Financial freedom index −0.0455
(0.0873)
−0.2024
(0.0000
*0.0515
(0.0554)
−0.1103*
(0.0000)
−0.0074
(0.7810)
0.0103
(0.6988)
−0.1050*
(0.0001)
1.0000
Private credit GDP ratio −0.0797
(0.0020)
*0.2405
(0.0000)
*−0.0058
(0.8240)
−0.2795*
(0.0000)
0.5517*
(0.0000)
−0.2239*
(0.0000)
0.0128
(0.6241)
0.1493*
(0.0000)
1.0000
Restrictions on activity −0.1372
(0.0000)
*0.0176
(0.4883)
−0.0229
(0.3707)
−0.0216
(0.3959)
−0.0377
(0.1367)
−0.0457
(0.0713)
0.0685*
(0.0080)
−0.4661*
(0.0000)
−0.0477
(0.0642)
1.0000
Supervision quality −0.0044
(0.8722)
0.0132
(0.6269)
0.0195
(0.4797)
−0.1178*
(0.0000)
−0.0920*
(0.0007)
−0.0636*
(0.0195)
−0.4688*
(0.0000)
0.2106*
(0.0000)
0.0637*
(0.0211)
−0.1534*
(0.0000)
1.0000
Overall capital stringency 0.0145
(0.5673)
−0.0703*
(0.0055)
0.0133
(0.6026)
−0.0977*
(0.0001)
0.2066*
(0.0000)
0.0055
(0.8299)
−0.1370*
(0.0000)
0.0219
(0.4107)
0.0394
(0.1264)
0.2977*
(0.0000)
0.0287
(0.2929)
1.0000
Government ownership 0.0106
(0.7029)
0.2090*
(0.0000)
−0.0420
(0.1357)
−0.0363
(0.1940)
0.2471*
(0.0000)
−0.1216*
(0.0000)
0.1314*
(0.0000)
−0.6361*
(0.0000)
−0.1581*
(0.0000)
0.2500*
(0.0000)
−0.3078*
(0.0000)
0.1909*
(0.0000)
1.0000
* Denotes significance at 5%.
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Table 5
Robustness check for performance of Islamic banks in Africa: controlling for government ownership.
Business Orientation Efficiency Asset Quality Stability
Fee income Loans
deposit ratio
Cost income
ratio
Overheads Loan loss
provisions
NPL Z-score ROAA Equity assets
ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Islamic 0.0351
(0.127)
−0.854
(1.227)
−0.146**
(0.0580)
−0.0358
(0.0639)
0.544*
(0.325)
−0.128***
(0.0488)
52.84***
(16.51)
0.00782*
(0.00401)
0.0639**
(0.0288)
Assets (log) −0.00422
(0.00386)
−0.0907
(0.0556)
−0.0425***
(0.0141)
−0.00670
(0.00408)
−0.000695
(0.000767)
−0.00294
(0.00326)
−2.761**
(1.122)
0.00165*
(0.000877)
−0.0130***
(0.00347)
Other earnings −0.00135*
(0.000768)
0.00600
(0.00802)
0.000145
(0.000753)
−0.000734**
(0.000297)
0.000470
(0.000796)
−0.000148
(0.000130)
−0.0131
(0.0368)
4.79e-05
(9.26e-05)
0.000249
(0.000509)
Fixed assets 0.659
(0.507)
0.577
(1.804)
6.492***
(1.786)
0.973***
(0.288)
0.0122
(0.120)
1.285**
(0.528)
−0.676
(17.54)
−0.430***
(0.0989)
0.171
(0.376)
GDP per capita (log) 0.00497
(0.00932)
0.304
(0.203)
−0.0140
(0.0304)
−0.0572***
(0.0121)
−0.00251
(0.00249)
−0.00422
(0.00753)
0.100
(2.888)
−0.00196
(0.00203)
0.0180
(0.0112)
GDP growth −0.219
(0.148)
1.759
(2.477)
0.0129
(0.352)
0.564***
(0.129)
0.0449
(0.0453)
−0.0190
(0.161)
9.626
(7.825)
−0.0321
(0.0581)
−0.201
(0.128)
Concentration ratio −0.0622
(0.0628)
−1.161
(1.538)
−0.0866
(0.116)
0.0871
(0.0541)
−0.0350**
(0.0177)
−0.140**
(0.0632)
4.374
(6.644)
0.0257*
(0.0134)
0.0576
(0.0394)
Financial freedom index −0.000452
(0.000591)
−0.0114
(0.0123)
6.15e-06
(0.00160)
0.000796
(0.000486)
0.000203
(0.000134)
−0.000880
(0.000564)
0.0669**
(0.0314)
−0.000205*
(0.000115)
−5.37e-05
(0.000339)
Private credit GDP ratio 0.0332
(0.0398)
0.834
(0.604)
0.203***
(0.0676)
−0.0849**
(0.0358)
0.0152*
(0.00862)
0.0594**
(0.0271)
13.92**
(6.668)
−0.0182***
(0.00688)
−0.0472
(0.0303)
Restrictions on activity −0.000309
(0.0116)
0.373
(0.315)
−0.00112
(0.0183)
0.00488
(0.00779)
0.00579
(0.00393)
0.00980
(0.00887)
3.043
(2.268)
−0.00169
(0.00167)
0.00577
(0.00490)
Supervision quality −0.000225
(0.00715)
−0.0337
(0.123)
0.00992
(0.0229)
0.0165*
(0.00898)
−0.00285*
(0.00157)
0.00139
(0.00584)
0.626
(1.537)
−9.45e-06
(0.00155)
0.0116**
(0.00548)
Overall capital stringency 0.00144
(0.00508)
−0.167**
(0.0806)
−0.0112
(0.0186)
−0.0129***
(0.00499)
−0.00299
(0.00215)
−0.00465
(0.00432)
−0.728
(1.313)
0.00358***
(0.00119)
0.00124
(0.00441)
Government ownership 0.0901*
(0.0533)
−0.119
(0.607)
−0.0656
(0.123)
0.231***
(0.0488)
0.0297**
(0.0132)
0.155
(0.0963)
20.19**
(7.976)
−0.0201**
(0.00836)
0.0261
(0.0370)
Constant 0.239**
(0.0948)
−0.0640
(1.250)
0.840***
(0.285)
0.899***
(0.120)
0.0432
(0.0279)
0.169*
(0.0990)
14.63
(20.49)
0.0268
(0.0222)
0.00278
(0.104)
Year  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 1042 1118 1096 1106 1051 687 1126 1124 1126
Banks 216 217 217 218 213 166 218 218 218
This table compares performance of African Islamic and conventional banks while controlling for government ownership in the banking sector. Our sample is a 6 period panel of yearly observations over the period
2005–2010. It covers 290 commercial banks from 45 African countries. Estimations (1) to (9) are done using GLS clustered by banks. P-values are computed using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and are
reported between the parentheses. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% level. For a detailed description of variables and data sources, please refer to Appendix 2.
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Table 6
Robustness check for performance of Islamic banks in Africa: controlling for government ownership and country effects.
Business orientation Efficiency Asset quality Stability
Fee income Loans
deposit ratio
Cost income
ratio
Overheads Loan loss
provisions
NPL Z-score ROAA Equity assets
ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Islamic −0.0629
(0.100)
−1.972
(1.672)
−0.0834
(0.108)
−0.152***
(0.0419)
0.587**
(0.292)
−0.207***
(0.0747)
40.51**
(17.00)
0.0162**
(0.00730)
0.0406
(0.0290)
Assets (log) −0.00782
(0.00876)
−0.196*
(0.118)
−0.0710***
(0.0223)
−0.0163**
(0.00698)
−0.000649
(0.00103)
−0.00559
(0.00406)
−4.088***
(1.370)
0.00338***
(0.00119)
−0.0259***
(0.00608)
Other earnings −0.00155**
(0.000771)
0.00254
(0.00552)
−0.000769
(0.000532)
−0.000692***
(0.000259)
0.000336
(0.000917)
−0.000488***
(0.000166)
−0.0450
(0.0286)
0.000190**
(7.84e-05)
−0.000138
(0.000309)
Fixed assets 0.574
(0.484)
1.895
(2.020)
6.820***
(1.913)
0.857***
(0.288)
0.0117
(0.118)
1.088**
(0.478)
−2.187
(17.81)
−0.463***
(0.0992)
0.0618
(0.337)
GDP per capita (log) −0.0760
(0.0837)
0.396
(0.371)
−0.00836
(0.0734)
−0.0440
(0.0446)
−0.00116
(0.00832)
−0.0134
(0.0179)
−0.350
(8.104)
0.00699
(0.0106)
0.0401
(0.0361)
GDP growth −0.0164
(0.166)
1.535
(2.671)
0.124
(0.338)
0.524***
(0.139)
0.0307
(0.0454)
0.0366
(0.154)
9.033
(8.211)
−0.102
(0.0808)
−0.303**
(0.149)
Concentration ratio 0.00642
(0.122)
−3.134
(3.683)
0.0672
(0.327)
−0.00203
(0.110)
0.0230
(0.0334)
0.142
(0.124)
4.777
(7.299)
−0.0318
(0.0318)
0.0174
(0.0731)
Financial freedom index 0.000352
(0.000468)
−0.0105
(0.0142)
−0.00171
(0.00191)
0.00123**
(0.000527)
0.000144
(0.000168)
−0.000358
(0.000636)
0.0749**
(0.0366)
4.84e-05
(0.000152)
0.000445
(0.000341)
Private credit GDP ratio 0.119
(0.208)
−3.310
(3.342)
0.685*
(0.399)
−0.111
(0.124)
0.104**
(0.0463)
0.577**
(0.256)
11.13
(12.15)
−0.288**
(0.122)
−0.654***
(0.236)
Restrictions on activity 0.0488
(0.0491)
0.998
(1.155)
−0.0253
(0.0862)
0.000489
(0.0286)
0.00399
(0.0130)
0.0514
(0.0456)
12.75**
(6.336)
0.0169
(0.0137)
0.0845***
(0.0285)
Supervision quality −0.172
(1.170)
1.085
(6.257)
−0.0420
(0.841)
−0.218
(0.256)
0.0868
(0.0929)
0.719**
(0.323)
7.622
(38.30)
0.103
(0.0920)
0.471*
(0.278)
Overall capital stringency −0.0422
(0.322)
−0.528
(1.821)
0.196
(0.292)
−0.0553
(0.104)
0.0455
(0.0298)
0.282***
(0.0969)
12.28
(17.04)
−0.0174
(0.0256)
0.0633
(0.0940)
Government ownership 0.165
(0.688)
0.384
(3.418)
−0.437
(0.472)
0.0752
(0.127)
0.0685
(0.0547)
0.509**
(0.220)
15.21
(12.15)
0.0409
(0.0485)
0.282*
(0.159)
Constant 1.395
(7.281)
−2.782
(37.53)
−0.175
(5.551)
2.171
(1.927)
−0.717
(0.597)
−5.221**
(2.041)
−149.1
(314.3)
−0.297
(0.556)
−2.589
(1.861)
Year  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 1042 1118 1096 1106 1051 687 1126 1124 1126
Banks 216 217 217 218 213 166 218 218 218
This table compares performance of African Islamic and conventional banks while controlling for government ownership in the banking sector and fixed country effects. Our sample is a 6 period panel of yearly
observations over the period 2005–2010. It covers 290 commercial banks from 45 African countries. Estimations (1) to (9) are done using GLS clustered by banks. P-values are computed using heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors and are reported between the parentheses. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% level. For a detailed description of variables and data sources, please
refer to Appendix 2.
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sI. Faye et al. / Review of Deve
overnment ownership in the banking sector. Available empir-
cal evidence shows that countries dominated by public banks
re more likely to report lower performance. Results compar-
ng performance of Islamic banks and conventional banks while
ontrolling for government ownership variables are stable and
ummarised in Table 5. They suggest that Islamic banks have
ower cost to income and non-performing loan ratios as well
s lower insolvency risk; they are better capitalised and have
igher ROAA and they are more conservative when it comes to
rovisioning bad loans
While results reported in Tables 2 and 5 seem robust, they
ould reflect non-observable country characteristics. To test this
rgument, we rerun all specifications in Table 5 while adding
ountry fixed effects. Results reported in Table 6 support our
revious conclusion that Islamic banks are more stable. Only
quity to assets loses its significance. We also find that Islamic
anks have lower NPL ratios and higher levels of loan loss pro-
isions. The above-mentioned results showing Islamic banks to
e more efficient than conventional banks through a lower cost
o income ratio is not robust to control for countries fixed effects.
owever, the effect of the Islamic bank type on overheads as an
lternative measure of efficiency is negative and significant in
olumn (4).
.  Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to improve understanding of the
slamic finance market in Africa. Specifically the paper provides
hat we believe is the first comprehensive mapping of the market
or Islamic finance in Africa and the first quantitative assessment
f foreign Islamic funding that benefited Africa. The last part of
he paper empirically explores differences in the performance of
frican Islamic and conventional banks.
Our mapping exercise reveals that Africa counts 116 institu-
ions offering Islamic financial services: 74 institutions offering
slamic banking, 33 companies offering Islamic insurance
Takaful), 4 Islamic investment funds, and 5 institutions offering
slamic microfinance services. Over 40% of these institutions are
ocated in Sudan which imposes compliance with Shariah  on the
ntire financial sector. Overall, results show that the market for
slamic finance in Africa remains embryonic.
Consistent with trends observed in the global Islamic finance
arket, Islamic banking dominates the African Islamic mar-
et, yet Islamic banking providers represent less than 10% of
ommercial banks operating in the 21 countries where Islamic
nance is available. Islamic insurance is the second most devel-
ped segment with total premiums collected estimated at USD
r
o
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40 million as of 2012. While North Africa emerges as the
egion counting the largest number of Islamic finance providers,
t ranks second when it comes to Islamic banking which is
ore developed in east Africa. We attribute this trend to the
exible approach that East African regulators have been adopt-
ng. Such approach fosters innovation and may have facilitated
he development of Islamic banking in the region. There are
lso strong cross-country variations in the type of non-banking
slamic finance services that have been developed. While West
frican countries have been developing Islamic microfinance
nd Takaful, these 2 services are not existent in Morocco. South
frica has been on the other hand more active in offering Islamic
nvestment funds.
We also show that Africa received about USD 14 billion in
roject finance from Islamic sources over the period 2005–2012,
ut of which USD 10 billion were provided by Islamic devel-
pment finance institutions. The main beneficiaries of these
esources were projects located in North Africa which alone
aptured about 82% of the funding provided. This is likely
o be a reflection of the conducive environment that North
frican countries offer and cultural and religious ties with the
ountries providing Islamic resources. The financial sector was
he main beneficiary of this funding followed by infrastructure.
et, investments in the financial sector were not necessarily
one in countries where financial sectors are most advanced
uch as South Africa and Mauritius. African sovereign and
rivate entities raised also USD 1.6 billion in Sukuk  over the
eriod 2005–2013 Q2. While amounts received by Africa in
he form of Sukuk  or project finance may seem high at first
ight, they remain negligible compared to the continent’s needs.
or instance, annual funding needs for infrastructure alone are
stimated at USD 93 billion.
The last part of the paper provides an empirical investigation
f differences in business orientation, efficiency, asset quality
nd stability between African Islamic and conventional banks.
e find that Islamic banks are more stable as they report lower
nsolvency risk and higher return on average assets. They also
ave lower NPLs and higher provisions. The result for NPLs is
ikely a reflection of the asset backed nature of Islamic banking
hile the result for the loan loss provisioning ratio suggest a con-
ervative approach to provisioning for Islamic banks. We also
nd some evidence supporting the superior efficiency of Islamic
anks. Our findings are robust to controls for government owner-
hip in the banking sector and countries’ fixed-effects. While our
esults should be interpreted with caution given the small size of
ur Islamic bank sample, we believe that they present interesting
acts that could be further explored in future research.
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Appendix  1.
Description of samples used in previous studies assessing the performance of Islamic banks.
Reference Countries/regions Sample size Number of Islamic banks covered Period
Mohamad et al. (2007) 21 countries from the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC)
countries
80 43 1990–2005
ˇCihák and Hesse (2010) 20 Middle East, Asian and African countries 474 77 1993–2004
IMF (2009) Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries 50 18 2008
Gamaginta and Rokhim (2010) Indonesia 83 12 2004–2009
Beck et al. (2013) 141 countries 2956 99 1995–2007
Al-Khasawneh et al. (2012) 4 North African countries 20 – –
Halkano (2012) Kenya 7 2 –
Rajhi (2012) 16 Middle East, North Africa and South East Asian countries 557 90 2000–2008
Johnes et al. (2012) 19 countries 255 45 2004–2009
This table describes samples used in the papers discussed in the literature review on the performance of Islamic banks.
Appendix  2.
Variables description and data sources.
Variable Definition Source
Bank-performance variables
Fee income Share of fee-based income in total operating income. It is calculated as the ratio of net fee and
commission to total operating income. Total operating income is the sum of net interest
revenues and other operating income
Bankscope
Loans deposit ratio Total loans divided by total deposits and short term funding. Total loans are the value of the
loan portfolio after the deduction of specific loan-loss provisions. Total deposits and short term
funding is the sum of customer deposits, deposits from Banks and other deposits and
short-term borrowings
Bankscope
Cost income ratio Total operating costs divided by total operating income Bankscope
Overheads The ratio of overhead cost divided by total cost. Total cost is the sum of interest expenses and
non-interest expenses
Bankscope
Loan loss provisions The ratio of loan loss provisions to gross loans Bankscope
NPL Value of nonperforming loans divided by the total value of the loan portfolio Bankscope
Z-score See Section 3.1 Authors’ calculations
ROAA Return on average assets Bankscope
Equity assets ratio Total equity divided by total assets Bankscope
Bank-speciﬁc variables
Islamic Dummy variable (=1 for Islamic banks, 0 = otherwise) Bankscope
Assets (ln) Natural logarithm of total assets (USD million) Bankscope
Other earnings The share of non-interest earning assets in total assets Bankscope
Fixed Assets Ratio of fixed assets to total assets Bankscope
Country-speciﬁc variables: Macroeconomic variables
GDP per capita (ln) Natural logarithm of the GDP per Capita (USD) World Development Indicators
GDP growth GDP growth rate World Development Indicators
Private credit GDP ratio Ratio of private credit offered by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP World Development Indicators
Financial freedom index Financial freedom is a measure of banking efficiency as well as a measure of independence
from government control and interference in the financial sector. The variable ranges between
0 and 100
Heritage Foundation
Country-speciﬁc variables: Regulation and supervision variables (please refer to Triki et al. (2013) for a detailed description of these variables)
Restrictions on activities Captures information about banks’ ability to own and control non-financial institutions and
non-bank financial institutions conduct non-core bank activities or offer electronic banking.
Higher values indicate more restrictions on banks to offer non-core banking services. This
variable is calculated using an unweighted average of indicators and ranges between 0 and 10
Making Finance Work For Africa
(MFW4A)/African development Bank
(AfDB) financial regulation database
Overall capital stringency Captures information about capital requirements, loans classifications and provisioning.
Higher values indicate more stringent requirements. This variable is calculated using an
unweighted average of indicators and ranges between 0 and 10
MFW4A/AfDB financial regulation
database
Supervision quality Captures information about supervisory independence, power and resources in the country.
Higher values indicate tighter levels of supervision quality. This variable is calculated using an
unweighted average of indicators and ranges between 0 and 10
MFW4A/AfDB financial regulation
database
Country-speciﬁc variables: Bank market structure and ownership variables
Government Ownership Fraction of total banks’ assets that is held by the government MFW4A/AfDB financial structure
Concentration ratio Percentage of assets of three largest banks as a share of asse
databasets of all commercial banks World Development Indicators
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